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CAN THERE REALLY BE "FREE SPEECH" IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS?

by
Richard W. Garnett*
The Supreme Court's decision in Morse v. Frederick leaves unresolved
many interestingand difficult problems about the authority of public-school
officials to regulate public-school students' speech. Perhaps the most
intriguingquestion posed by the litigation, decision, and opinions in Morse
is one that the various Justices who wrote in the case never squarely
addressed: What is the "basic educational mission" of public schools, and
what are the implications of this "mission" for officials' authority and
students' free-speech rights? Given what we have come to think the Free
Speech Clause means, and considering the values it is thought to enshrine
and the dangers against which it is thought to protect, is it really possiblefor
the freedom of speech to co-exist with the "mission" of the public schools? We
all recall JusticeJackson's stirring rhetoric in the West Virginia flag-salute
case: "If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation," he
proclaimed, "it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be
orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion[.]"
But, is this really true-could it be true?-inpublic schools?

I.
It is not entirely clear-not to this writer, anyway-why the Court
agreed to review the lower-court decision 2in Morse' or that the case is, at
the end of the day, particularly important.
* John Cardinal O'Hara, C.S.C. Associate Professor of Law, University of Notre
Dame. I am grateful to Gerard Bradley, John Robinson, Amy Barrett, Paolo Carozza,
Nicole Garnett, and Paul Horwitz for their helpful comments and suggestions.
It is possible that those Justices who voted to take up the case were troubled by
the fact that the Ninth Circuit's decision left the school principal, Ms. Morse, open to
liability for money damages. See Frederick v. Morse, 439 F.3d 1114, 1123-25 (9th Cir.
2006), rev'd, Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618 (2007). However, it is widely believed
by Court-watchers and litigators that the Justices rarely grant certiorari merely to
correct errors in the application of law. It is also possible, of course, that a decision by
the Ninth Circuit, extending free-speech protection to a "BONG HiTS 4 JESUS"
banner was-particularly given the Court's ever-shrinking docket-simply too
tempting an opportunity to let pass by.
2 Cf Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2637 (Alito, J., concurring)
("I do not read [the
majority] opinion to mean that there are necessarily any grounds for [school-speech]
regulation that are not already recognized in the holdings of this Court.... Ijoin the
opinion of the Court on the understanding that the opinion does not hold that the
special characteristics of the public schools necessarily justify any other speech
restrictions.").
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Certainly, there are a number of interesting student-speech cases
3
that have recently been decided or that are moving through the courts.
Technological changes and other developments continue to raise
difficult questions-how to treat students' speech on blogs and other
websites, for example-about the reach of the Court's school-speech
doctrines.4 There are splits and divisions in the lower courts about
controversial and offensive student expression. And, as the National
Association of School Boards emphasized in its amicus brief supporting
certiorari, school administrators working to balance free speech,
discipline, safety, and effective learning are in desperate need of
"guidance."5 But, the Court's decision in Morse did little to clear up the
confusion about where, for free-speech purposes, the school stops and
the public square begins, because the Justices took it as given that it was a
school-speech case,6 involving expression at a "school-sanctioned and
school-supervised event."7 The case leaves unanswered hard questions
about the circumstances in which what Justice Stevens called, somewhat
cryptically, "targeted viewpoint discrimination" might be permissible in
public schools. And, it seems unlikely that many school administrators
found much clear "guidance" (even if they were relieved by the outcome)
in the ruling.
So, why all the fuss? Why the inclusion of Morse in the various
"Supreme Court round-ups" published in our top newspapers (and law
reviews)? Why the sounding, by so many, of the "First Amendment
bugle"?' Part of the answer, one suspects, is that, for many who cover and
3 See, e.g., Harper v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 445 F.3d 1166 (9th Cir.
2006)
(upholding suspension of student who wore T-shirt expressing religious
condemnation of homosexuality), vacated, 127 S. Ct. 1484 (2007).
4 See, e.g., Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 496 F. Supp. 2d 587 (W.D.
Pa. 2007)
(concluding that it violated a student's free-speech rights to suspend him for an
online parody of school principal). See generally, e.g., Sandy S. Li, The Need for a New,
Uniform Standard: The Continued Threat to Internet-Related Student Speech, 26 Loy. L.A.
ENT. L. Rrv. 65 (2005); Erwin Chemerinsky, Students Do Leave Their First Amendment
Rights at the Schoolhouse Gates: What's Left ofTinker?, 48 DRAKE L. REv. 527 (2000).
, Brief of Amicus Curiae National School Boards Association et al. in Support of
Petitioners at 3, Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618 (2007) (No. 06-278).
6 See Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2624 ("[W]e reject Frederick's
argument that this is not
a school speech case- as has every other authority to address the question."). The
other Justices, in their various separate writings, did not contend, or even suggest,
that Morse was not a school-speech case.
' Id. at 2622.

8 Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2646 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Cf id. at 2638 (Alito, J.,
concurring) (" [T] he public schools may ban speech advocating illegal drug use. But I
regard such regulation as standing at the far reaches of what the First Amendment

permits.").
9 Id. at 2629 ("The dissent's contrary view [on the question whether Frederick's
banner promoted illegal drug use] hardly justifies sounding the First Amendment
bugle."). See, e.g., Melissa Daniels, 'Bong Hits' Case Still Haunts Roberts as Protesters Hit
Quad,
DAiLy
ORANGE,
Sept.
20,
2007,
http://.www.dailyorange.com/
media/storage/paper522/news/2007/09/20/News/bong-Hits.Case.Still. Haunts.
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comment on the Court's work, it is difficult to imagine an
inconsequential free-speech case. It could also be relevant that Morse
involved an exotic location like Juneau, Alaska"' and the snicker-worthy
term, "BONG HiTS"! What's more, the case fits-though not
perfectly"-the standard, "sharp turn to the right" account of October
Term 2006 and its closely-divided decisions. 1 And, even if short on
doctrinal guidance, the case is full of curiosities. For example, the case
attracted a number of amicus briefs by religious-liberty-focused and rightleaning groups, who argued in opposition to the brief filed on behalf of
the Bush Administration and in company with the A.C.L.U. (Division in
the ranks! Strange bedfellows!) Justice Stevens wrapped himself more
closely in the role of the amiable, if slightly hectoring, avuncular
storyteller, sharing lessons from his youthful experiences with
Prohibition.13 Justice Thomas filed, to the horror of some and the
fascination of others, another "yes, I really mean it about this
'originalism' business!" concurrence.
Perhaps the most intriguing question posed by the litigation,
decision, and opinions in Morse is one that the various Justices who wrote
in the case never squarely addressed: What is the "mission"-i.e., the
"basic educational mission" 1-of
public schools? Both Ms. Morse
• 16 and the
United States had-to the dismay of Mr. Frederick's many amici 1-urged
the Court explicitly to make the public schools' "basic educational
mission" the key to its school-speech doctrines. 17 The Solicitor General,
for example, proposed that "public schools may prohibit speech that is
inconsistent with their basic educational mission in order to disassociate
themselves from such speech, and thereby reinforce the values ...

Roberts.As.Protesters.Hit.Quad-2980102.shtml

they

(quoting Josh Snodgrass, "a senior

English and religion major," as saying that the duct tape over his mouth symbolized
"free speech liberties being taken away").
10 This writer lived for a time inJuneau. It is a beautiful, if not-very-sunny, place.
See Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2638 (Breyer, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part)
("This Court need not and should not decide this difficult... issue on the merits.").
12 See, e.g., Robin Toner, The 2008 Election and the Supreme Court, N.Y. TIMES,
July 4,
2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/04/us/polifics/O4web-toner.html ("It was a
session marked by a sharp turn to the right in a series of 5-to-4 decisions."); Erwin
Chemerinsky, Turning Sharply to the Right, 10 GREEN BAG 2D 423, (2007)
("Conservatives finally got their Court.").
13 Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2643, 2651 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
" Id. at 2629-36 (Thomas, J., concurring). See also, e.g., Van Orden v. Perry, 545
U.S. 677, 694 (2005) (Thomas, J., concurring); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549,
601 (1995) (Thomas,J., concurring).
1
Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685 (1986).
16 See, e.g., Brief Amicus Curiae of the Christian Legal Society in Support of
Respondent, Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618 (2007) (No. 06-278).
"7 Brief for Petitioner at 21, Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618 (2007) (No. 06278) (urging Court to affirm that public schools may censor and punish speech that
"undermines [their] basic educational mission").
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seek to teach."' 8 Similarly, the National School Boards Association urged
the Court to appreciate the richness of that mission-a mission that, they
insisted, extends beyond technical training and classroom exercises-and
to defer to school officials' judgments about how best to carry it out.)9
True, the Court did not endorse or enforce such a broad rule. For
Chief Justice Roberts, it was enough to note simply that schools have
"special characteristics" which "circumscribe []" students' free-speech
rights and that "Congress has declared that part of a school's job is
educating students about the dangers of illegal drug use."2 ° Accordingly,
he reasoned, school officials may "restrict student speech at a school
event, when that speech is reasonably viewed as promoting illegal drug
use."21 But, in a concurring opinion, which Justice Kennedy joined,
Justice Alito took care to reject the broad "educational mission"
argument, insisting that it "would give public school authorities a license
to suppress speech on political and social issues based on disagreement
with the viewpoint expressed" 22and that it therefore "strikes at the very
heart of the First Amendment."
23

At one point in the 1991 blockbuster film, The Silence of the Lambs
Dr. Hannibal "The Cannibal" Lecter is toying with Clarice Starling, an
earnest, ambitious F.B.I. agent-in-training who is eager-desperate,
even-for clues and insights that might help her catch a serial killer
known as "Buffalo Bill." 24 "Everythin, you need to know," Lecter assures
her, is in the pages of the case file. 5 "Then tell me how," she entreats
him. Lecter replies, "First principles, Clarice. Simplicity. Read Marcus
Aurelius. Of each particular thing ask: What is 26it, in itself, what is its
nature... ? What does he do, this man you seek?"
So, what might Marcus Aurelius-or, Dr. Hannibal Lecter-have to
say about the "mission" of public schools? What are these institutions?
What is their aim, the point of their enterprise, from which, some argue,
free-speech doctrine should take its shape? "What is [their] nature"?

" Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 19,
Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618 (2007) (No. 06-278).
9 See, e.g., Brief of Amicus Curiae National School Boards Association et al., supra
note 5, at 29 ("[S]chool districts should be permitted to regulate speech that, in the
reasonable professional judgment of school officials, undermines their core
educational mission .. ").
20 Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2626,
2628.
21 Id. at 2625; see also id. at 2629.
22 Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2637 (Alito,J., concurring). This same point was powerfully
argued in, for example, the amicus curiae brief filed by the Liberty Legal Institute.
See, e.g., Brief of the Liberty Legal Institute as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Respondent at 5-9, Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618 (2007) (No. 06-278).
2s THE SILENCE OF THE LAMBS (Orion Pictures 1991).
24 Id.
25 Id.
26 Id.
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"What do[] [they] do"? And, given what we have come to think the Free
Speech Clause means, and considering the values it enshrines and the
dangers against which it protects, is it really even possible for the
freedom of speech to co-exist with the "mission" of the public schools?
Think of Justice Jackson's famously stirring-if a bit florid 27 rhetoric in the West Virginia flag-salute case: "If there is any fixed star in
our constitutional constellation," he proclaimed, "it is that no official,
high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics,
nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion[.]y 28 Is this really
true-could it be true-in public schools?
II.
Two principles, or maxims, framed the Justices' analysis in Morse.
First, "students do not 'shed their constitutional rights to freedom of
speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate."'2 9 Fair enough. Only
Justice Thomas refused to toe this line, insisting that our "Constitution
does not afford students a right to free speech in public schools. '0
Second, and "[a]t the same time, we have held that 'the constitutional
rights of students in public school are
' 3 not automatically coextensive with
the rights of adults in other settings. 1
This two-part starting point is entirely consistent with a leading freespeech leitmotif The rules and standards that constrain government
regulation of speech are, in part, a function of the capacity in which the
government is acting. 2 Governments have more leeway to discipline their
employees' speech than they do to punish private citizens for theirs;
officials may control speakers' access to the floor of the Senate but notfor the most part-to their soapbox; the public authority may "speak"through public-service announcements, commissioned art works, etc.even when it lacks the power to require people to speak, and so on.
The First Amendment, after all, is first and foremost a check on the
acts and aims of government. True, it expresses deep philosophical

27
218

Steven D. Smith, Barnette's Big Blunder, 78 CHI.-KENT. L. REv. 625 (2003).
W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).

Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2622 (2007) (quoting Tinker v. Des
Moines Indep. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969)).
30 Id. at 2634 (Thomas,J., concurring).
" Id. at 2622 (quoting Bethel School Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 682
(1986)). See also, e.g., Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 655-56 (1995)
("[W]hile children assuredly do not shed their constitutional rights ... at the
schoolhouse gate, the nature of those rights is what is appropriate for children in
school." (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).
3
See, e.g., EUGENE VOLOKH, THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND RELATED STATUTES:
PROBLEMS, CASES, AND POLICYARGUMENTS 2 (2d ed. 2005) (urging students confronted

with free-speech problems to consider "whether the government is acting in a special
capacity, such as employer, landlord, public school educator, and the like, rather than
acting as sovereign (exercising its powers to control everyone's conduct)").
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commitments, promotes and reflects fundamental values, and facilitates
human flourishing-it does and means many things-but it does all this
by regulating official action: "Congress shall make no law .... " So, the
Amendment directs attention and analysis to the doings of state actors,
public officials, legislators, etc. It also demands appreciation for the fact
that, again, governments act in all kinds of ways and in a variety of
capacities. Public officials enact and enforce criminal statutes; run jails
and courts; operate schools and hospitals; hire, employ, and fire millions
of people; conduct research and assemble football teams; sponsor
advertisements and monuments; manage parks and forests; build roads
and office buildings; sort and deliver mail; collect taxes and disburse
benefits; raise armies and fight wars.
The point here-one that then-Justice Rehnquist pressed more than
thirty years ago-is that the particular constraints the First Amendment
imposes on government activities will often vary, depending on the
activity at issue, or on the capacity-regulator, subsidizer, pro perty
manager, employer, and so forth-in which the government acts. 3 The
Supreme Court's free-speech doctrine makes it easier for government to
control demonstrations in government buildings, or to regulate what
teachers say in the classrooms of public elementary schools, than to
prosecute newspaper publishers for hostile editorials. The rules that
apply to an official's decision to fire a public employee for her
outrageous or offensive comments are not the same as those that apply to
an effort to criminalize such comments.
We could also approach the matter at a slightly different angle.
Instead of breaking out the many different capacities in which the
government acts, or listing the vast and growing array of things
governments do and aims they pursue, we could-following Professor
Robert Post-narrow our focus to the "nature of the government
authority in question.3 5 There are, Post has proposed:
two kinds of government authority, corresponding to two distinct
regimes of first amendment regulation. The first is what I call
"managerial" authority, with which the state is characteristically
invested when it acts to administer organizational domains
dedicated to instrumental conduct. In such contexts tht

"' Some of the discussion that follows is adopted from Richard W. Garnett, Less Is
More: Justice Rehnquist, The Freedom of Speech, and Democracy, in THE REHNQUIST LEGACY
26-42 (Craig M. Bradley ed., 2006).
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 290 (1976) ("The limits imposed by the First and
Fourteenth Amendments on governmental action may vary in their stringency
depending on the capacity in which the government is acting."). See also Int'l Soc'y
for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 678 (1992) ("Where the government
is acting as a proprietor, managing its internal operations, rather than acting as
lawmaker with the power to regulate or license, its action will not be subjected to the
heightened review to which its actions as a lawmaker may be subject.").
'5 Robert C. Post, Between Governance and Management: The History and Theory of the
Public Forum, 34 UCLA L. REv. 1713, 1717 (1987).
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government may constitutionally regulate speech as necessary to
achieve instrumental objectives. The second kind of authority can
be termed that of "governance." It is characteristic of the authority
which the state exercises over what Hannah Arendt has called the
"public realm": the arena in which members of the general public
meet to accommodate competing values and expectations, and
hence in which all goals or objectives are open to discussion and
modification. The government's ability to restrict speech in the
public realm is limited by ordinary and generally applicable
principles of first amendment adjudication. 36
Or, we could look not at the capacity in which the government acts,
or at the nature of the authority it exercises, but at the institutional
context of the speech at issue. Inspired by Frederick Schauer and
others,3 7 we might examine the extent to which the speech-regulation
constraints under which the government operates should take their
shape from the character, history, and aims of the institutions in which it
confronts speech. Too often, Schauer has complained, our free-speech
law has been "institutionally oblivious,"3 and failed to take into account
important features of, or differences among, various institutions. At the
same time, as Professor Scott Moss has pointed out, there are some
doctrinal areas-and student-speech is one-which are quite sensitive to
institutional context.39
The point is, each of these approaches and insights is consistent with
the foundation on which the Morse decision is built: public-school
students' free-speech rights, such as they are, take their shape and receive
their bounds from the nature of the school enterprise and the "special
characteristics of the school environment." 40 They are not a function
merely of the fact that public-school students tend not to be adults.4
After all, there is not a general free-speech rule permitting governments
to censor children on the basis of the content or viewpoint of their
speech. It is not as if the Brandenberg "imminence" requirement is
bracketed when a speaker is a minor, or as if children have a lesser right
to engage in Buckley-type expression by contributing to campaigns and
candidates. 42 In the school-speech cases, the doctrine does not reflect the
speaker's age, but rather her situation and status as a student-in-school. It
Id. (footnote omitted).
" See generally, e.g., Frederick Schauer, Towards an InstitutionalFirstAmendment, 89
MINN. L. REV. 1256 (2005).

Id. at 1264.
See generally, Scott Moss, Students and Workers and Prisoners-OhMy! A Cautionary
Note About Excessive Institutional Tailoring of First Amendment Doctrine, 54 UCLA L. REV.
1635 (2007).
'0 Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2622 (2007) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (citing Hazelwood School Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 266 (1988), and
Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969)).
4! As it happens, Mr. Frederick was eighteen years old when he was suspended.
Brief for Respondent at 1, Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618 (2007) (No. 06-278).
12 See McConnell v. F.E.C., 540 U.S. 93, 231-32 (2003) (plurality opinion).
'9
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is the school enterprise-the public school's "mission"-that drives the
decisions.43 (Otherwise, it would hardly matter whether or not Mr.
Frederick's banner was displayed "during normal school hours," at an
"approved social event or class trip," under the supervision of "[t]eachers
and administrators," surrounded by the "band and cheerleaders." 44)
So what, for free-speech purposes, are the salient features of the
public schools and the animating aims of public education? The public
schools are a government enterprise, 4 and the Free Speech Clause will
apply in a way, and to an extent, that is consistent with the purpose and
nature of that enterprise. 46 The challenge posed by the Tinker line of
school-speech cases, then, is to decide how the Free Speech Clause
applies, and this challenge can be met only by thinking about what the
public-education enterprise is.
III.
Writing for the Court in the 1986 Fraser decision,47 Chief Justice
Burger explained that the First Amendment's Free Speech Clause does
not "prevent[] a school district from disciplining a high school student
for giving a lewd speech at a school assembly,, 4 or from "determining
that to permit a vulgar and lewd speech ... would undermine the
school's basic educational mission.
After all, he observed, "vulgar
speech and lewd conduct is wholly inconsistent with the 'fundamental
values' of public school education. , 50 In support of this observation, he
cited the Court's 1979 Ambach decision, in which the Court identified the
"inculcat[ion of] fundamental values necessary to the maintenance of a

41 Cf James E. Ryan, The Supreme Court and Public Schools, 86 VA. L. REV. 1335,
1397 (2000) ("Although the nature of students as children has some explanatory
power, it is ultimately a problematic and incomplete explanation .... "). On the other
hand, the Court's Establishment Clause decisions involving schools have often
emphasized the immaturity-and, accordingly, the vulnerability-to-religiousindoctrination-of children. See, e.g., School Dist. of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S.
373, 390 (1985) (noting that "symbolism of a union between church and state is most
likely to influence children of tender years"). And, the First Amendment's constraints
do, in some other circumstances, take account of the special interest in protecting
children from certain words or messages. See, e.g., F.C.C. v. Pacifica Foundation, 438
U.S. 726 (1978); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2624.
'5 See id. at 2637 (Alito, J. concurrence) ("The public schools are invaluable and
beneficent institutions, but they are, after all, organs of the State.").
46 See Ryan, supra note 43, at 1403 ("[T]he unifying theme is that the Court
alters
constitutional standards and upholds school policies or practices when doing so
appears necessary to preserve the academic function of public schools.").
4' Bethel School Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
'

49

Id. at 677.
Id. at 685.

5I Id. at 686-87.
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democratic political system" as the "objective[] of public education."' In
addition:
The role and purpose of the American public school system were
well described by two historians, who stated: "[P]ublic education
must prepare pupils for citizenship in the Republic .... It must

inculcate the habits and manners of civility as values in themselves
conducive to happiness and as indispensable to the practice of selfgovernment in the community and the nation. ,52
Right away, then, it seems we are not examining, and students are
not operating within, a context where "one man's vulgarity [may be]
another's lyric, 3 or where it is either possible or desirable to encourage
"uninhibited, robust, and wide-open" conversation.54 One need not
embrace Justice Thomas's methodology or conclusion in Morse to suspect
that what he said of "the earliest public schools"-i.e., that "teachers
taught, and students listened[, t]eachers commanded, and students
obeyed"'5-fits pretty well the former ChiefJustice's understanding of the
school's aims.
In Tinker, Justice Fortas's opinion for the Court did not explore in
great detail the mission of public education, or the implications of that
mission for students' free-speech rights. "First Amendment rights," he
stated, "applied in light of the special characteristics of the school
environment, are available to teachers and students."56 That said, there
runs through the opinion a clear and-for the time-typical confidence
that "fear or apprehension of disturbance is not enough to overcome the
right to freedom of ,expression";51after all, "our Constitution says we must
take [the] risk" of disturbance . In other words, it is not so much the
special characteristics of the school as the unavoidable features of an
open society that dominate the discussion. We know that state-operated
schools are not "enclaves of totalitarianism," bent on "foster[ing] a

homogenous people," 5" but, as for what they are, we are given little
besides the (improbable) suggestion that, even in primary and secondary
schools, "[t]he classroom is peculiarly the 'marketplace of ideas.' 59

51
51

Id. at 681 (citing and quoting Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 76-77 (1979)).
Id. at 681.

"' Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 25 (1971).
54 N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
'5Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2631 (2007) (Thomas,J., concurring).
5
Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969).
57 Id. at
508.
5' Id. at 511 (quoting Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 402 (1923)).
5'Id. at 512 (quoting Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967)). To
characterize this suggestion as "improbable" is not to deny that, in many ways, the
search for truth goes on in elementary and secondary school classrooms. However, it
seems to me that, in these contexts, this search goes on in a very different-that is, a
controlled and constrained-way than that which is evoked by the image of the
.marketplace of ideas."
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Perhaps Chief Justice Burger's purpose, then, in devoting a section
of his Fraseropinion to the "role and purpose" of the American publicschool system was to wring out of the school-speech cases some of the
Brandenburgand Sullivan attitude toward expression and disruption. Yes,
there is a place, even in public schools, for "unpopular and controversial"
views, but the need for these views, and the right to express them, "must
be balanced against the society's countervailing interest in teaching
Indeed, the
students the boundaries of socially appropriate behavior.
work of public schools is not so much to serve as triple-A marketplaces of
ideas-they are not, Justice White would emphasize later in Kuhlmeier,
"forum [s] for public expression"662'-but to "teach by example the shared
values of a civilized social order.
'6

As the Morse litigation was proceeding, the notion that "[a] school
need not tolerate student speech that is inconsistent with its 'basic
educational mission' ''63 was heavily emphasized by the principal and her
supporters, and resisted-or at least qualified-by Frederick and a wide
range of civil-liberties and religious-freedom organizations. The latter, in
particular, worried that the "educational mission" standard could serve as
an invitation to regulate student speech with religious content. Such
speech, after all, might be divisive and distracting to some. The concern,
clearly, was that some of the gains religious-liberty advocates have secured
in recent years--decisions requiring equal-treatment of religious speech
64
in limited public forums, for example -could be rolled back.
What follow are just a few examples of how the "educational mission"
argument was deployed and countered: The Brief for Petitioner
(authored by former federal judge, special prosecutor, and now lawschool dean Kenneth W. Starr) emphasized the "challenge" posed by
"declining academic performance in the age of globalization" and said
that "[p]reventing teenage drug use is a critical educational mission of
our public schools." 65 The Solicitor General agreed, insisting that "[a]
school district can reasonably conceive of its mission as including not
only educating students, but doing so in an environment that keeps them
free from the scourge of drugs during their K-12 years." More
generally, the United States put at the heart of the public schools'
mission the "inculcat[ion of] fundamental values necessary to the
maintenance of a democratic political system. 6 7

"o Bethel School Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 681 (1986).
6, Hazelwood School Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 267 (1988).
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Fraser,478 U.S. at 683.

Kuh1meier, 484 U.S. at 266 (quoting Fraser,478 U.S. at 685).
See, e.g., Good News Club v. Miford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98 (2001); Lamb's
Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1993).
6 Brief for Petitioner, supra note 17, at 26.
Brief for the United States, supra note 18, at 7.
67 Id. (quoting Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 77 (1979)).
6
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The amicus briefs filed by educators and school administrators were
even more ambitious in proposing content for the schools' mission.
Quoting Brown v. Board of Education, the National School Boards
Association cast public education as "the very foundation of good
citizenship" and "a princip[al] instrument in awakening the child to
cultural values." 6 What's more, the Association contended both that local
school boards were entitled to wide latitude in defining their schools'
education mission and that courts should defer to teachers' and
administrators' decisions about how best to advance and protect the
mission through speech regulation.
As was noted earlier, this emphasis on public schools' claimed right
to regulate speech in the service of their educational mission, broadly
understood, triggered a diverse array of powerfully argued amicus briefs
emphasizing the dangers inherent in the deference and discretion
claimed by the schools. It also prompted a separate writing by Justice
Alito, in which he said that "[t] his argument can easily be manipulated in
dangerous ways, and I would reject it before [it] ... occurs."69 He

worried, in particular, that some schools would "define[] their
educational missions as including the inculcation of whatever political
and social views are held by" the relevant officials. 70 For Justice Alito, the
distinctive feature of the "school setting" to be emphasized is not the
schools' formative role in inculcating public values but rather their more
prosaic obligation to protect students from the "threats to their physical
safety" posed by illegal drugs.
There is, of course, much more that could be said about the history,
purpose, and evolution of public schools. And yet, enough has been said
already to justify the suggestion that Tinkers vision was insufficiently
attentive to the fact that schools are government-run institutions, charged
with forming and shaping students' values, loyalties, commitments, and
manners. One can share-as this writer does-the worries ofJustice Alito
and Mr. Frederick's amici about the imposition of majoritarian
orthodoxies in the guise of mission-required discipline and still wonder if
these worries reflect a failure to confront, in a clear-eyed way, the
implications of state-run schools. One can agree with Justice Alito that
the "educational mission" argument "give[s] public school authorities a
license to suppress speech on political and social issues based on
disagreement with the viewpoint expressed," and yet suspect that such a
license is unavoidable 2
Consider H.L. Mencken's view of the aim of public education. It is
not, he suggested, "to fill the young of the species with knowledge and
"' Brief of Amicus Curiae National School Boards Association et al., supra note 5,
at 5.

. Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2637 (2007) (AlitoJ., concurring).
70 Id.
7' Id. at
72 Id.
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awaken their intelligence. ... Nothing could be further from the truth.
The aim ... is simply to reduce as many individuals as possible to the
same safe level, to breed and train a standardized citizenry, to put down
dissent and originality."" Henry Adams expressed a similar view, though
perhaps in a less gloomy way: "All State education," he believed, "is a sort
of dynamo machine for polarizing the popular mind; for turning and
holding its lines of force in the direction supposed to be [the] most
effective for State purposes. 7 4 Perhaps, to be fair, this puts a too-gloomy
(if Menckenish) cast on the enterprise. Still, there is no denying that
public education in the United States is an aggressively ideological
enterprise, one that long aimed at Americanizing--sometimes
Protestantizing-the children of immigrants and Catholics. 5 The fearor maybe the conviction-is unmistakable in the briefs of Mr. Frederick's
religiously-affiliated amici that the schools are up to something similar
still.
And, why should we be surprised? We are talking, after all, about
education, and education by the government. It would be strange to
expect the government not to care about education's content and effects.
Drawing on the discussion above, the government acting in its capacity as
"educator," exercising its "management" authority, could hardly be
expected to regard the project in which it invests so much as narrowly
confined to protecting students' safety and equipping them with various
technical skills.
As I have suggested elsewhere,76 "education" is best understood as
the indivisible process of acquiring beliefs, premises, and dispositions
that are our windows on the world, that mediate and filter our
experience of it, and that govern our evaluation and judgment of it.
Education is what attaches us to those goods and ends that attract, almost
gravitationally, our decisions and actions. It is precisely because
education is really, in the end, the process and craft of soul-making, and
is as much about transmitting values and loyalties to our children as it is
73 John

Taylor Gatto, Against School: How Public Education Cripples Our Kids, and
Why, HARPER'S MAG., Sept. 2003, at 33, 35 (quoting Mencken).
74
HENRY ADAMS, THE EDUCATION OF HENRY ADAMS: AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY 78
(Norman S. Berg ed., Houghton Mifflin Co. 1975) (1918).
75 See generally, e.g., Richard W. Garnett, American Conversations With(in)
Catholicism, 102 MICH. L. REv. 1191 (2004) (reviewing JOHN T. MCGREEVY,
CATHOLICISM AND AMERICAN FREEDOM: A HISTORY (2003)); Richard W. Garnett, The
Theology of the Blaine Amendments, 2 FIRST AMENDMENT. L. REv. 45 (2003). See also, e.g.,
CARL F. KAESTLE, PILLARS OF THE REPUBLIC: COMMON SCHOOLS AND AMERICAN SOCIETY,
1780-1860, at 76 (Eric Foner ed., 1983) (describing the "ideology" of the common
schools as "republicanism, Protestantism, and capitalism"). For more on the ideology
of the common-school movement, see generally CHARLES LESLIE GLENN,JR., THE MYTH
OF THE COMMON SCHOOL (1988); LLOYD P.JORGENSON, THE STATE AND THE NON-PUBLIC
SCHOOL 1825-1925 (1987); JOSEPH P. VITERITTI, CHOOSING EQUALITY: SCHOOL CHOICE,
THE CONSTITUTION, AND CrvIL SOCIETY 145-79 (1999).
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about outfitting them with useful data and "skill sets," that we care, argue,
and even fight so much about it. We care about education not just
because we think it matters what facts and figures our children and our
fellow citizens know. We care-more particularly, the government
cares-because, we think, it matters what they value, it matters what-and
in what-they believe, and it matters to and for what they aspire. After all,
a political community can no more perpetuate itself without attending
carefully to the dispositions of its citizens than a religious community that
77
does not evangelize each new generation can hope to thrive and survive.
In Horace Mann's words, "It may be an easy thing to make a republic; but
it is a very laborious thing to make Republicans. "78 This is true, and it
presents the question, whether "the freedom of speech" can
meaningfully, non-disingenuously be imported into government
enterprises charged with this "laborious thing."
IV.
As has already been mentioned, a number of scholars have
endorsed, and taken to heart, Professor Schauer's complaint that First
Amendment doctrine "has been persistently reluctant to develop its
principles in an institution-specific manner, and thus to take account of
the cultural, political, and economic differences among the
differentiated institutions that together comprise a society., 79 Institutions
vary, however, and their differences matter. And so, Schauer has urged
the Supreme Court to embrace and employ an "institutionally sensitive
approach" in at least certain free-speech cases.80
Among those leading the way in developing such an approach is
Professor Paul Horwitz. 8 l In particular, Horwitz has contended that some
71 William

A. Galston, Expressive Liberty, Moral Pluralism, PoliticalPluralism: Three
Sources of Liberal Theory, 40 WM. & MARY L. REv. 869, 870 (1999) ("Liberal democratic
citizens are made, not born .
); GEORGE WILL, STATECRAFT AS SOULCRAFT: WHAT
GOvERNMENT DOES 90-91 (1983) ("[M]en and women are biological facts, but that
ladies and gentlemen fit for self-government are social artifacts, creations of the
law.").
78 STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE DISSENT OF THE GOVERNED: A MEDITATION ON
LAW,
RELIGION, AND LOYALTY 42 (1998) (quoting Horace Mann, The Importance of Universal,
Free, Public Education).
71 Frederick Schauer, Comment, Principles, Institutions, and the First Amendment,
112 HARv.L. REv. 84, 84 (1998).
'0 See generally Frederick Schauer, Institutions as Legal and Constitutional Categories,
54 UCLA L. REv. 1747 (2007); Frederick Schauer, Towards an Institutional First
Amendment, 89 MINN. L. REv. 1256 (2005).
"' See generally, Paul Horwitz, Three Faces of Deference, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
(forthcoming
2008)
(on
file
with
author),
available
at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1018969; Paul Horwitz, Universities as First Amendment
Institutions: Some Easy Answers and Hard Questions, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1497 (2007); Paul
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(2006),
available at
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institutions-"First Amendment institutions"-"play a significant role in
contributing to public discourse" and "are both institutionally distinct
and largely self-regulating according to a set of institutional norms,
practices, and traditions." Universities are (at their best) such "First
Amendment institutions," and so "[1] egal doctrine should recognize the
special role [they play] under the First Amendment by largely deferring
to these institutions and permitting them to govern themselves according
sense of academic mission, without government
to their own
83
interference."
What about public schools? Are public schools "First Amendment
institutions"? In what way? And, if so, how does this cut? Does the "special
role" public schools play in "contribut[ing] to public discourse" weigh in
favor of more judicial supervision of officials' speech regulations or less?
On the one hand, Justice Brennan was clearly of the view that the
reasoning and result in Tinker were consonant with-indeed, required
by-an appropriate appreciation for the fact that "[p]ublic education
serves vital national interests in preparing the Nation's youth for life in
our increasingly complex society and for the duties of citizenship in our
democratic Republic. 8' 4 On the other hand, the educators' and
administrators' amicus briefs, quoted earlier, reflect an equally firm
conviction that public schools' First Amendment role is best served by
deference to, and discretion for, school officials.
So, as Horwitz has already asked, "[i]f universities are entitled to be
treated as First Amendment institutions and granted substantial
autonomy accordingly, are K-12 public schools similarly entitled"?8 5 In
his view, they are not:
[U]niversities are sites for the exchange of ideas, and for the
production of free speech, in the form of research, publication,
speeches, conferences, and so on. Public schools, on the other
hand, primarily serve the First Amendment as sites for the
production of the facility for free speech: that is, they teach children
so that they will have the capacity to be engaged and active citizens
elsewhere and later in life. 8
This is a sensible point. At the same time, perhaps it does not go far
enough. To reiterate a question that has surfaced several times in this
Essay: how can a constitutional provision whose aim, many think, is to
constrain the government from interfering in or directing a diverse and
82 Horwitz, Universities as First Amendment Institutions, supra note 81, at 1497. See

also, e.g., Richard W. Garnett, Do Churches Matter? Towards an Institutional
(2008) (forthcoming).
Understandingof the Religion Clauses, 53 VILL. L. REv. " Horwitz, Universitiesas First Amendment Institutions,supra note 81, at 1498.
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Hazelwood School Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 278 (1988) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
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public schools_.html (Mar. 21, 2007).
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pluralistic society's conversations about the common good be
incorporated into a context in which the state-again, that which this
constitutional provision binds-is exercising "managerial" authority for
the purpose of producing not just certain facilities, but certain core
values, loyalties, and commitments? It is not hard to agree that
universities-institutions which are soaked in traditions of independence,
self-government, and state-checking-play an important structural role in
the landscape of civil society, clearing out the space necessary for
discovery and dissent. Public K-12 schools, on the other hand, seem
more like anti-First Amendment-or, perhaps, pre-First Amendmentinstitutions. No wonder the Court continues to struggle to formulate
free-speech doctrine that takes into account these schools' "special
characteristics."
CONCLUSION
"There's no such thing as free speech," Professor Fish has said, "and
it's a good thing, too."'87 Certainly, Fish's work is a valuable gut-check, and
a useful corrective to the tendency to get too comfortable with high-flying
rhetoric about speech, liberalism, neutrality, and politics. Even so, it
seems strange to close an essay on the Supreme Court's most recent case
involving the application of the First Amendment in public schools with
the suggestion that it cannot, in the end, apply very well. To be clear:
given all the givens, Mr. Frederick's amici and Justice Alito did well to
resist the suggestion that government officials charged with running
public schools should enjoy immunity from the suspicion that rightly
attaches to all content-based regulations of speech, particularly those
regulations that purport to aim at protecting and developing shared civic
values. That said, we all do well to remain skeptical about the
compatibility of government-run education with the freedom of speech.
Does this mean that education is not, in fact, all that Chief Justice
Burger said it is, that it is not-in the words of Brown-"the very
foundation of good citizenship" and "a princip[al] instrument in
awakening the child to cultural values"?88 Not at all. It means, instead,
that the freedom of speech would be better served, nurtured, and
protected if education, richly understood, took place in non-state "First
Amendment institutions," at public expense. But, that is a matter for
another essay.89
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